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Although  global  financial  stability  in  late  2010  and  early  2011  has,  in  general, 
improved when compared to the 2008-2009 period of the sub-prime global financial crisis, 
vulnerabilities  remain  high.  The  recent  World  Economic  Outlook  of  the  IMF  (WEO, 
September 2011) underlines the two speed recovery processes taking place in the world 
economies.  In  advanced  economies,  especially  those  hit  hardest  by  the  crisis,  firms, 
government and household sectors continue to be heavily indebted and are likely to spur 
relatively weak demand. Although the financial markets of these economies have, in most 
parts, returned to profitability, the overall frail balance sheets reflect the general subdued 
state of the local economy. 
 
In sharp contrast, the emerging economies, including those of the SEACEN region, 
are posting robust growth rates until the second half of 2011, meeting new challenges 
associated with strong demand, rapid credit and excess liquidity. Price pressures, including 
potential asset price bubbles, have been the common themes of policy challenges for the 
SEACEN  economies.  Managing  macro-financial  risks,  namely  balancing  growth,  balance 
sheet soundness of the financial institutions, particularly the banking sector, and keeping a 
lid on inflationary pressures, have been and will likely be the primary policy challenges for 
these emerging markets in 2011 and 2012. 
 
This paper takes stock of recent trends and developments with regard to capital 
flows in the SEACEN economies. It elaborates in detail, the breakdowns and compositions 
of the flows. In particular, the focus of the analyses is  on key flows such as the international 
bank lending activities to the region.  The paper  also summarises and analyses some of the 
basic push and pull factors of these flows  to understand some of the domestic and external 
drivers of these flows. Some of the economic consequences of these capital flows and policy 
dilemma facing the SEACEN economies are also looked at. The paper also  examines the  
policy responses of the central banks/monetary authorities, in particular, to mitigate the 
negative  consequences  and  maximise  the  benefits  of  capital  flows. 1 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
Although  global  financial  stability  in  late  2010  and  early  2011  has,  in  general, 
improved when compared to the 2008-2009 period of the sub-prime global financial crisis, 
vulnerabilities  remain  high.  The  recent  World  Economic  Outlook  of  the  IMF  (WEO, 
September 2011) underlines the two speed recovery processes taking place in the world 
economies.  In  advanced  economies,  especially  those  hit  hardest  by  the  crisis,  firms, 
government and household sectors continue to be heavily indebted and are likely to spur 
relatively weak demand. Although the financial markets of these economies have, in most 
parts, returned to profitability, the overall frail balance sheets reflect the general subdued 
state of the local economy. For the rest of 2011, the fragile financial institutions and the 
unsustainable  fiscal  position  of  the  Euro  economies  will  likely  be  the  source  of  major 
vulnerability and risk for the world economy.  
 
Furthermore, a recent update on the unemployment rate of the US has also added 
uncertainty  in  the  overall  outlook  for  global  economic  recovery.  In  June  2011,  the  US 
economy  only  added  18,000  additional  jobs,  despite  the  massive  quantitative  easing 
policies.  In  August,  no  additional  job  was  reported  in  the  US  economy.  This  latest 
employment  trend  is  the lowest  in  twelve months,  exacerbating  fears  that  the  nascent 
recovery is stalling in the face of high petrol prices, knock-on effects from the Japanese 
tsunami,  debt  overhang  in  the  US  and  the  Euro-zone  and  chronically  weak  consumer 
confidence. The unemployment rate in the US ticked up to 9.1 per cent in second quarter of 
2011. In August 2011, the Standard & Poor stripped the US economy of its triple-A credit 
rating. 
 
Macroeconomic and financial outlook in the Euro-zone have also been the source of 
concern for the world economy. In mid-July 2011, Ireland’s bond was downgraded to junk 
status, triggering further concern that this will have some ramifications on Greece’s debt 
problem, in particular, and other highly indebted euro-zone economies, in general. The 
downgrade in the economic rating of Italy in September have fueled further worries on the 
sustainability of the fiscal position in many neighbouring economies particularly and the 
euro-zone  in  general.  The  only  silver  lining  came  from  the  relatively  robust  export 
performance of the US and the Euro-zone, riding on the strong demand coming from the 
emerging markets of Asia and Latin America. Furthermore, a recent economic report from 
Japan has also been a more positive one. The economic output in July 2011 is expected to 
return to the level prior to the March 2011 earthquake. Looking ahead, however, there are 
many remaining challenges facing the Japanese economy, which includes its weak labour 
market. 
 
In sharp contrast, the emerging economies, including those of the SEACEN region, 
are posting robust growth rates until the second half of 2011, meeting new challenges 
associated with strong demand, rapid credit and excess liquidity. Price pressures, including 
potential asset price bubbles, have been the common themes of policy challenges for the 
SEACEN  economies.  Managing  macro-financial  risks,  namely  balancing  growth,  balance 
sheet soundness of the financial institutions, particularly the banking sector, and keeping a 2 
 
lid on inflationary pressures, have been and will likely be the primary policy challenges for 
these emerging markets in 2011 and 2012. 
 
The first part of this study takes stock of recent trends and developments with 
regard  to  capital  flows  in  the  SEACEN  economies.  Taking  advantage  of  the  survey 
conducted by the Research and Learning Contents Department of The SEACEN Centre on 
selected SEACEN member economies, the next section elaborates in detail, the breakdowns 
and compositions of the flows. In particular, the focus of the analyses will be on key flows 
such as the international bank lending activities to the region.   
 
The Report then summarises and analyses some of the basic push and pull factors of 
these flows (Section 3). The primary objective here is to understand some of the domestic 
and  external  drivers  of  these  flows.  Next,  we  look  closely  at  some  of  the  economic 
consequences  of  these  capital  flows  and  policy  dilemma  facing  the  SEACEN  economies 
during the recent years. The discussion will then concentrate on the policy responses of the 
central banks/monetary authorities, in particular, to mitigate the negative consequences 
and maximise the benefits of capital flows. The Report ends with some forward looking 
analysis and brief concluding remarks.  
 
 
2.   Waves of Capital Inflows across the SEACEN Region 
 
2.1  Global Setting 
 
In 2010, private capital flows to emerging economies revived sharply and should 
continue to be relatively buoyant in 2011 and 2012, as ongoing robust growth and financial 
deepening  encourage  greater  foreign  investments  (IIF,  June  2011).  Net  private  capital 
inflows to emerging economies are estimated to be USD 990 billion in 2010, some USD 350 
billion higher than in 2009. The projected private flows in 2011 and 2012 are even higher 







































In terms of the composition of the flows, most of the increase in capital inflows in 
2010 was due to higher bank and non-bank debt flows, although equity investments also 
picked up. In addition, the current account surplus of the emerging market also increased 
marginally in 2010. These sources of funds  were balanced by strong emerging market 
external asset acquisitions, including a surge in reserve accumulation. Looking at the net 
private capital flows by region, Emerging Asia was the largest recipient of flows at around 
USD 499.5 billion in 2010 as compared to USD 264.9 billion for Latin America, USD148.4 
billion for Emerging Europe and US$76.9 billion for Africa/Middle East. For 2011, it is 
forecasted that net private capital inflows into emerging markets of Asia will be around 
USD  484.1  billion,  representing  more  than  45%  of  total  private  inflows  to  emerging 

















Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets – By Region 
(Billions of USD) 
 
  2009  2010  2011f  2012f 
 
Total Private Inflows, net  643.7  989.8  1041.1  1056.4 
 
  Emerging Asia   377.5  499.5  484.1  446.0 
 
  Latin America  155.5  264.9  254.7  238.5 
 
 Emerging Europe  56.0  148.4  246.6  300.1 
 
  Africa/Middle East 
 
54.6  76.9  55.7  71.8 
e = estimate, f = IIF forecast 
Source: IIF (June 2011). 
 
 
2.2   Updates of Trends for SEACEN Economies   
 
Following the remarkable economic recovery across the region, fueled by abundant 
global liquidity associated with loose monetary policy and increased risk appetite in major 
advanced economies, most SEACEN economies had, in general, seen a substantial turn-
around in capital flows, leading to positive overall net capital flows and favourable balance 
of payment positions (Table 2 and Figure 2). Between 2008 and 2009, the capital outflows 
totaled  USD221.3  billion  but  the  trend  was  reversed  in  2010,  with  registered  capital 
inflows  of  USD36.6  billion.2  Equally  important  to  note  is  that  the  net  capital  inflows 
remained positive consistently throughout all four quarters of 2010.  
 
The  first  half  of  2011  saw  another  round  of  very  volatile  period  of  capital 
movements in and out the Asian region. In the first quarter of 2011, the region saw a small 
net capital outflow of USD7 billion. This was due to USD3.4 billion and USD8.7 billion 
outflows in portfolio and other investments respectively. However, by the second quarter 
of 2011, there was a large  surge in capital flows into the SEACEN economies.  In that 
quarter alone, net capital inflows registered USD43 billion, larger than the totaled annual 
inflows  in  2010.  The  net  capital  inflows  were  overwhelmingly  dominated  by  portfolio 
inflows since 2009.  This shows that while net portfolio flows were relatively volatile, 
investors  continue  to  channel  their  funds  into  this  region  in  search  of  higher  yields. 
However,  the  trend  was  different  for  foreign  direct  investments  as  both  inward  and 
outward direct investments rebounded in 2010. While the region remained an attractive 
venue  for  foreign  direct  investments,  there  is  increasing  trend  of  domestic  companies 
continuing to tap profitable opportunities outside their respective economies. 
                                                              
2 Excludes China, Papua New Guinea and Myanmar. 5 
 
Table 2 





Data excludes China, Papua New Guinea and Myanmar. 
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Figure 2 





               Source: Survey conducted by The SEACEN Centre and the CEIC Database. 
 
 
Given the diversities of the economies, the composition and the size of these net 
flows differ from one SEACEN economy to another. In general, those at the early stages of 
their  economic  development  and  are  endowed  with  abundant  natural  resources 
experienced massive injection of direct investments. In the case of Mongolia for instance, 
there was a dramatic increase in FDI inflows, amounting to USD1.874 billion in 2010, an 
almost  140 percent  rise  from  the  level  in  2009.  The  investments  in  the  mining  sector, 
particularly for copper, gold and coal, accounted for a major share of the investments. A 
similar phenomenon was reported in Myanmar where in 2008/9, direct investments to the 
power, oil and gas and mining sectors attracted a little less than USD1 billion. However, 
with rapid liberalisation of various key sectors of the economy, viz. agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing sector, foreign direct investments to the economy soared to well above USD 
19 billion in 2010/11. A significant jump in FDI was also reported in Cambodia where in 
2010, net direct investments increased by around 48 per cent, primarily in the agricultural 
and textile sectors.  
 
The role of FDI is expected to grow in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. In 2010, 
Indonesia saw FDI increase by more than 250 per cent from that reported in 2009. A mild 
increase in FDI was reported for Thailand in 2010 in comparison to the previous year, 
albeit still lower than the level in 2008. Malaysia welcomed almost RM28 billion in FDI in 
2010 as compared to a mere RM5 billion in 2009. However, not all SEACEN economies 
continued to attract increasing FDI. For example, Sri Lanka and the Philippines have seen 
FDI numbers moderate slightly in 2010 as compared to a year earlier. It is also important 7 
 
to highlight here that a number of SEACEN economies, such as Malaysia, Korea, Chinese 
Taipei  and  Singapore,  have  long  been  reporting  outward  direct  investments  to  take 
advantage  of  the  higher  returns  beyond  the  border.  In  the  case  of  Chinese  Taipei,  a 
significant rise in direct investments abroad in 2010 contributed to the sudden turnaround 
- from net inflows of around USD2.6 billion and USD 5.9 billion in the first and second 
quarter of 2010, respectively, to net outflows of USD 2.5 billion and USD 6.6 billion in the 
third and fourth quarter of 2010, respectively. 
 
In most of the SEACEN economies with more developed capital markets, portfolio 
inflows  dominated  and  accounted  for  the  largest  share  of  net  capital  inflows  into  the 
domestic markets (Figure 2). A fair share of these portfolio investments into the SEACEN 
economies targeted sovereign bonds and securities. This is evidently demonstrated in the 
case of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. In Indonesia, foreign holdings of government 
bonds increased by USD3 billion during the period of February to April 2011, boosting 
foreigners’ share of outstanding bonds to 33 per cent. In comparison, the respective share 
in the US was 42 per cent while in Korea it was 15 per cent of total outstanding bonds. 
Equity investments in local firms and banks were also strong, reflecting the return of risk 
appetites of global investors and abundant liquidity, driven partly by the expansionary 
monetary policies of advanced economies.   
 
 
2.3  International Bank Claims 
 
Other  investments  have  also  increased,  particularly  bank  lending  of  the 
international banks. From an international bank lending perspective, the region has turned 
from debtor to net creditor throughout most of the subprime crisis period. As shown in 
Figure 3, the net claims of the BIS reporting banks in the SEACEN region during the period 
of March 2007 to March 2009, showed a significant outflow of cross border funds from the 
SEACEN economies. However, the trend reversed during the second quarter of 2009. This 
gap has widened significantly compared to before the crisis, following improvements in 
global liquidity resulting in significant inflows into the SEACEN economies This is reflected 
by  a  more  than  two-fold  increase  in  the  net  inflows  of  US$266  billion  during  the  last 
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Figure 3 
 External Position of Reporting BIS Banks vis-a-vis All Sectors 




Source: BIS Statistics. 
 
Total foreign claims of international banks, in general, sustained strong momentum 
in some of the emerging markets of the Asian region up to the fourth quarter of 2008. 
However, during the immediate weeks and months following the Lehman Brothers debacle, 
six  of  the  eight  SEACEN  economies  were  engulfed  in  a  sharp  and  sudden  reversal  of 
international bank claims. The unforeseen and sheer size of these reversals in international 
bank flows out of these six SEACEN economies saw the annual growth rate of these flows 
hitting negative territory by end- 2008, with the exception of Thailand and Sri Lanka.3 More 
recent data reveals that inflows of international bank lending have again returned strongly 
to these economies in 20104 (Table 3)5 and the first quarter of 2011(Figure 3). 
 
 
   
                                                              
3  Though Thailand only experienced a very marginal increase in international bank inflows. 
4  With the exception of Korea 
5  The  only  exception  is  Sri  Lanka, which  suggests  that  the  adverse  effects  of  the  Global  Financial Crisis 






























Indonesia  8.59  16.11  -6.27  -13.33  15.16  -0.85  14.01  31.8 
Korea  -0.97  20.09  -7.49  6.85  34.50  -19.98  16.76  -3.0 
Malaysia  0.84  16.12  15.88  1.39  16.69  -5.91  2.75  19.9 
Philippines  -2.98  6.08  10.30  -2.0  8.44  -20.35  10.89  26.1 
Singapore  18.8  10.0  -10.4  -0.9  15.3  -4.2  5.3  25.7 
Sri Lanka  7.09  3.62  21.87  2.34  22.93  14.24  -4.82  18.5 
Chinese Taipei  18.94  10.13  1.43  11.05  23.33  -15.60  21.09  46.6 
Thailand  8.45  30.65  -13.35  -9.19  9.32  1.61  19.38  30.6 
 
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics for the Basic Data and RLC Department of SEACEN. 
 
While international bank lending retreated substantially in almost all of the eight 
SEACEN economies in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers debacle, the key 
component of these international bank lending in the form of local claims of foreign banks 
operating within  the domain  of the  SEACEN economies,  remained  strong  and  was  less 
adversely affected by the external shock originating from the US. As depicted in Figure 4, 
while the local claims booked by offices of foreign banks retreated in Indonesia, Korea, 
Philippines and Thailand, such was not the case for Malaysia and Chinese Taipei in 2008. 
 
In retrospect, when we look back at previous crises such as the Asian financial crisis 
and the 2001-2002 collapse of the IT bubble in the US, almost all of the eight SEACEN 
economies experienced sharp reversals in total international bank flows during these two 
separate crisis periods similar to the one that recently occurred at end-2008.  However, 
remarkably, as noted above local claims of these international banks continue to register 
positive average annual growth rates during the past crisis episodes, namely the 1997 East 
Asian crisis and the 2001-2002 IT bubble. In addition, more recent data in the post-global 
financial  crisis  (GFC)  period  indicates  that  the  local  claims  of  foreign  banks  in  2010 
recovered immediately and grew positively in eight economies, with the lesser exception of 
Korea  (Figure  4).  The  almost  similar  experiences  across  a  broad  sample  of  SEACEN 
economies  highlights  the  indisputable  evidence  of  the  growing  inter-connectedness  of 
global banks to the SEACEN economies in which these same global banks act as a conduit of 






                                                              
6  For a more comprehensive study, refer to recent study conducted at The SEACEN Centre (Pontines and 
Siregar, 2011). 10 
 
Figure 4 
Average Annual Growth Rate of Foreign and Local Bank Claims in major  
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Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics and RLC Department of SEACEN. 
 
 
2.4  International Debt Securities 
 
In  the  case  of  net  international  debt  securities  issuance,  net  borrowings  which 
started  to  pick  up  from  June  2009  onwards,  experienced  a  drop  in  June  2010  before 
recovering in September 2010 (Figure 5).  With the exception of the government sector, net 
international debt securities issuance was negative in June 2010. However, from the third 
quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2011, all sectors registered net positive issuance. 
Among  the  sectors,  financial  institutions  registered  as  the  highest  issuers  of  net 
international  debt  securities,  which  accounted  for  around  80  percent  of  the  total 
international  debt  issuance  of  the  SEACEN  economies  in  March  2011(Figure  6).  This 
signifies  the  importance  of  financial  institutions’  role  in  raising  funds  in  the  SEACEN 
economies. 
 
Net international debts issued in all sectors were mostly volatile for the individual 
economies. During March 2011, the net international debt issued by the financial sector 
registered  the  largest  volume  in  China,  Korea  and  Singapore.  In  addition,  these  three 
economies led in the net international financial debt issuances  by the corporate sector 
during  the  same  period.  On  the  other  hand,  the  net  issuance  by  the  corporate  sector 
registered net negative flows in Indonesia.  In absolute terms, from March 2008 to March 
2011, Korea recorded the largest amount outstanding in terms of net international debt 
issued by the corporate sector, followed by Singapore and China. These three economies 
contributed  to  around  73  per  cent  of  the  total  amount  understanding  in  the  selected 
SEACEN  economies7.  For  the  financial  sector,  Korea,  China,  Singapore  as  expected, 
dominated the amount outstanding of financial debt securities (77 per cent of the total 
                                                              
7  The selected SEACEN economies are China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Chinese Taipei and Vietnam.  14 
 
outstanding). On the other hand, the amount outstanding in the government sector was 








Source: BIS Database. 
Data is for China, Vietnam, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,  
Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. 
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Figure 6 





Source: BIS Database. 
Data is for China, Vietnam, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,  
Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. 
 
 
2.5   Stock Market 
 
According to the World Federal of Exchanges (2011), during the first six months of 
2011, volumes were relatively stable (experiencing a mild contraction of -0.8 per cent) with 
large regional contrasts with the America’s trading decreasing by 9.3 per cent whereas 
Asia-Pacific’s volumes rose by 13.8 per cent. From June 2010 to June 2011, four SEACEN 
exchanges  were  among  the  top  ten  performers  world-wide  (Table  4).  In  terms  of 
percentage  change  in  the  same  period,  the  Colombo  Stock  Exchange  (48.0  per  cent), 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (33.5 per cent), Stock Exchange of Thailand (30.6 per cent) and 
Philippines  Stock  Exchange  (27.6  per  cent)  were  among  the  top  ten  performing  stock 
markets world-wide. The increase reflects the large portfolio flows into the SEACEN region. 
   16 
 
Table 4:  
Top 10 Performing Broad Market Indexes 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2011). 
 
 
3.   Push and Pull Determinant Factors of the Capital Surges 
 
The developing Asian economies continue to be the backbone of global economic 
growth.  While  the  advanced  economies  only  grew  by  about  3.0  per  cent  in  2010, 
developing Asia region reported a growth rate of slightly less than 10 per cent (World 
Economic  Outlook  (June  2011)).  More  importantly,  the  emerging  markets  of  Asia  are 
expected to remain as the growth engine of the world economy in 2011 and 2012, albeit 
with  more  moderate  forecasted  growth  rates.  As  mentioned  earlier,  global  liquidity, 
supported by quantitative easing measures in the advanced economies and the returns in 
investor risk appetites following signs of normalisation in the global financial markets in 
the first half of 2011, have added stimulus to the surge of capital inflows into the SEACEN 
economies.   
 
Several  push  (external)  and  pull  (domestic)  factors  have  contributed  to  the 
resurgence of capital flows into the SEACEN economies in 2010 and early 2011. The pull 
factors  being  higher  relative  interest  yields  (Figure  7),  booming  housing  markets  and 
expectation of appreciating domestic currencies, combined with rising sovereign debt risks 
in many advanced economies and sound domestic macroeconomic fundamentals together 
with strong growth prospects. In Malaysia, Korea, Chinese Taipei and Thailand, the interest 
rate differentials since 2008 have, on average, been below 3 per cent; in the Philippines and 
Australia around 4 per cent; while in Hong Kong, it is less than 1 per cent. Amid excessive 
domestic liquidity and strong private credit growth, both Indonesia and Sri Lanka had to 
keep the interest rate differential relatively high, at close to 7-8 per cent.   
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Figure 7: Policy Rate Differentials 
 
Indonesia                                      Malaysia 
 
 
Philippines                                          Thailand 
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Australia                                               Japan 
 
 
                  Sri Lanka 
 
              Source: SEG Database and CEIC Database. 
 
 
One can argue that the global financial crisis was a temporary watershed event for 
some  Asian  economies.  The  large  positive  growth  rate  differential  that  selected  Asian 
economies experienced with respect to the case of the US for the entirety of the early and 
mid-2000s in which economies to name a few such as the Philippines (2003Q2), Singapore 
(2004Q2),  Hong  Kong,  China  (2004Q2),  Malaysia  (2002Q4)  and  Thailand  (2003Q1) 
enjoyed positive quarterly growth differentials against the US of between 5 and 12 per 
cent,  disappeared  around  the  time  of  the  crisis  (Figure  8).  However,  along  with  the 
resurgence in capital flows in the region and amidst the lingering economic weaknesses in 
the developed economies in the aftermath of the recent crisis, these wide positive growth 
differentials had immediately returned to the region. Indeed, this large positive growth 

























































































































































































































































































































































the case of Indonesia, while large positive quarterly growth differentials in the order of 
between 3 per cent to as high as 14 per cent in the case of Singapore (2010Q1) have 
undoubtedly contributed to the resurgence in large capital inflows to the region during the 

































































































































































































































































































































A  number  of  emerging  SEACEN  economies  such  as  Indonesia,  the  Philippines, 
Mongolia and Sri Lanka have seen their sovereign rating upgraded, reflecting the overall 
sound macroeconomic positions which include fiscal strength. In Korea, the prospects of 
the Korean Stock Market joining the MSCI Developed Market Index and of the Korean Bond 
Market joining the World Government Bond Index (WGBI) contributed to the strong surge 
of portfolio capital. Closer economic integration with mainland China was also a crucial 
factor, especially for Hong Kong SAR and Chinese Taipei (with the expectation of the cross 
strait Economic Framework Agreement (ECFA)).  
 
  The  return  of  more  stable  political  and  economic  environment  has  also  been  a 
strong impetus for massive capital inflows. In Nepal and Sri Lanka for instance, the much-




































































































































































































































economies. In Cambodia, the commitments and efforts to pursue open market policies, to 
further  reform  the  economy,  and  to  improve  the  legal  and  institutional  infrastructure 
contributed immensely to making the economy an attractive investment location for both 
regional  and  global  investors.  In  more  developed  economies  such  as  Chinese  Taipei,  a 
number of tax incentives, such as reductions in the tax bequest rate and profit-seeking 
enterprise income tax rate, and full insurance of deposits, successfully attracted foreign 
deposits of local residents back into the domestic economy.    
 
 
3.1  Domestic and External Drivers of International Bank Lending 
 
In  a  recent  study  conducted  at  The  SEACEN  Centre  for  a  number  of  SEACEN 
economies  (Cambodia,  Chinese  Taipei,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines, 
Myanmar  and  Sri  Lanka),  Pontines  and  Siregar  (2011)  highlight  several  fundamental 
determinant factors of bank lending from three major advanced economies, namely Japan, 
the UK and the US to these SEACEN economies. To start with, the real GDP growth rates of 
the  home  (Japan,  UK  and  US)  and  host  (or  SEACEN)  economies  have,  indeed,  been  an 
important  factor.  In  particular,  the  pro-cyclicality  of  these  flows,  i.e.,  better  (worse) 
economic conditions in the host (home) economies leads to greater (less)  bank flows into 
some of these SEACEN economies. 
 
The short-term uncertainties and volatilities of the global economies, captured by 
the widely used S&P 100 Volatility Index (VIXt) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, are 
found  to  have  an  adverse  impact  on  the  flows  of  international  bank  lending  into  the 
SEACEN region. This finding strongly suggests that global/external factors have a role to 
play in determining bank flows from developed to emerging economies. The balance of the 
evidence also appears to suggest that greater exposure on the part of major foreign banks 
in  these  selected  SEACEN  economies  fulfill  a  stabilising  or  crisis-mitigating  role  of 
international bank lending during periods of financial distress such as that of the 1997 East 
Asian  financial  crisis.  However,  the  study  also  finds  the  opposite  case  for  the  recent 
subprime crisis. In short, for capital flows in general, we find the impacts and roles of 
international bank lending in the local economy can be a two-edged sword. In good times, 
the flows contribute positively to the financing of economic activities. However, during 
times of uncertainties in the local and external markets, international bank lending can 
amplify the severity of volatilities and hence the vulnerability risks of the local economy. 
 
 
4.   Economic Consequences of Flows and Policy Dilemma Facing the Local 
Authorities 
   
While inflows have largely been attracted by returns and strong prospects of the 
region, they have, nonetheless, benefited the economies on many fronts. Given the liquid 
financial markets, a higher rate of investment has, in general, been recorded across all 
SEACEN  economies.  As  mentioned  earlier,  for  some  economies  such  as  Australia  and 
Mongolia in particular, these funding enabled them to place substantial investments in the 
highly profitable mining and energy sectors. In general, the liquidity in the market has also 23 
 
led to a deepening of the financial markets in both capital and banking sectors,  and  a 
lowering of the cost of capital domestically in many SEACEN economies. 
 
  While there are benefits to be reaped from capital inflows, excessive, persistent and 
potentially unsustainable inflows could also lead to disruptions in the domestic economies. 
The old fear associated with ‘hot money’ flows has amplified in recent months. The surge of 
capital  inflows,  dominated  by  the  portfolio  flows,  has  accelerated  growth  in  credit, 
appreciated local currencies and potentially fuelled asset-price bubbles in securities and 
housing markets. As a caution, these inflows have long been known to have the potential to 
abruptly  stop  and  reverse,  triggering  a  sudden  drying  up  of  domestic  liquidity.  The 
pressures on the local currencies and domestic price levels have made the management of 
macroeconomic policies in general and monetary policy in particular more challenging. The 
next two sub-sections will further elaborate the consequences of these inflows for local 
currencies and asset prices.  
 
 
4.1   Domestic Inflation 
 
While deflation was the source of distress among policy makers in early 2009, the 
rising price level has taken over the driver seat in regional policy debates, especially since 
the first half of 2010, with very few exceptions such as Japan (Figure 9). The latest trends 
reported in May 2011 capture the consistent messages of enduring inflationary pressures 
across the SEACEN economies. Indonesia and China experienced relatively higher rates of 
annualised inflation of around 5.5 per cent in May 2011. Notable inflation rates were also 
reported in Korea, Singapore and Thailand, in the range of 4-4.5 per cent by May 2011. 
Natural  resource  abundant  economies  such  as  Mongolia,  reported  double  digit  and 
escalating inflationary pressure until the first quarter of 2011.   
 
The relentless rise of food and energy prices since 2010 played a major factor in 
explaining  the  strength of  inflationary  pressures  in  almost  all  SEACEN  economies.  The 
Economist Food Commodity-price Index in July 2011 has increased by about 37 per cent 
from a year ago. At the same time, the West-Texas intermediate price index, reported a 
similar increase of just slightly less than 35 per cent. The impacts of these increases on the 
global market were compounded also by the efforts of governments to reduce subsidies 
and allow the prices of a number of key commodities to increase, absorbing the general 
price increase of these goods in the international market. The rise in the price of fuel, for 
instance, has significant and wide pass-through impacts on transportation costs and food 
prices. The strong surge of capital inflows has also translated into rising core inflation in 
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Source: CEIC Database. 
 
 
4.2  Exchange Rate and Exchange Market Pressure Index 
 
With the rise in volatility and the size of capital flows affecting economies in the 
region, especially since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the foreign exchange market is 
one  of  the  key  markets  to  be  monitored  closely.  For  most  parts  of  2010,  appreciation 
trends, albeit in varying degrees, were reported for all SEACEN currencies. In many cases, 
this has in turn, attracted more speculative inflows in anticipation of further exchange rate 
appreciations,  resulting  in  a  vicious  cycle  of  speculative  inflows  and  exchange  rate 
appreciations. Some notable appreciating currencies against the US dollar are illustrated in 
Figure 10. The Australian dollar has appreciated against the US dollar by around 24.5 per 
cent by July 2011. Other SEACEN currencies that have strengthened against the US dollar 
by more than 10 per cent include those of Korea, Singapore and Chinese Taipei. The yen 
has  also  appreciated  by  around  8  per  cent  in  July  2011  from  last  year,  despite  the 
earthquake disaster in early 2011.The rapid appreciation and increased volatility of the 
yen in recent months prompted the authorities to intervene in foreign exchange markets in 






































Selected Annualised Exchange Rate Appreciation against the US dollar in July 2011 
 
 
Source: The Economist. 
 
With the combination of appreciating nominal exchange rate and relatively higher 
domestic inflationary pressure, the Indonesian rupiah, Malaysian ringgit, and Thailand baht 
for  instance,  experienced  the  strongest  real  effective  exchange  rate  appreciations,  with 
their  currencies  close  to  10-year  highs  in  August  2010.    The  Singapore  dollar  also 
appreciated to reach a 10-year high in real effective terms in August 2010, following the 
authorities’ move in April 2010 to tighten policy stance by re-centering the policy band 
upwards and returning to a modest, gradual appreciation of the nominal effective exchange 
rate.  
 
To  better  assess  the  pressures  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  in  a  recent  SEG 
Report  produced  by  The  SEACEN  Centre,  a  biannual  analysis  of  the  exchange  market 
pressure (EMP) index of the SEG currencies was included. However, before we report the 
update of the EMP index, it is worthwhile to briefly revisit the underlying concept of the 
EMP (Siregar, Mohd. Hussain and Pontines (2010)). To manage exchange rate volatility, 
central  banks  have  often  resorted  to  multiple  policy  instruments.  Buying  and  selling 
foreign  exchange  reserves  and  policy  rate  adjustments  are  arguably  two  of  the  most 
frequently adopted instruments. Any excess demand for foreign exchange, responsible for 
the volatility, can be fulfilled through non-mutually exclusive conduits. If the market or 
currency pressure is successful, there is a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency. 
However, at other times, the market pressure can be repelled or warded off through raising 
interest  rates  and/or  running  down  their  foreign  exchange  reserves.  Combining  the 
information on exchange rate fluctuation, interest rate adjustment and reserve movement, 
should convey a more informative and reasonable measure of the extent of pressures on a 
currency, or referred to as the index of exchange market pressure (EMP).  
 











We construct the EMP index by applying the Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (KLR, 
1998)  smoothing  method  to  weigh  the  three  components  of  the  index  of  speculative 





Where  t EMP  is the exchange rate market pressure index for the economy in period 
t;  t e   the units  of  economy‘s  currency per  U.S. dollars  in  period  (t); t R   is  gross  foreign 
reserves of the economy in period (t); itis the nominal interest rate for the economy in 
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, and  i σ  is the standard 
deviation of the rate of  change in the nominal interest rate i ∆ . By construction, a positive 
(negative) EMP index implies a selling (buying) pressure in the foreign exchange market. 
 
From our first report of the exchange market pressure index released in May 2010, a 
number of observations are worth revisiting. To start with, prior to 2008, the Malaysian 
ringgit, Thai baht, Korean won, NT dollar, Singapore dollar and Japanese yen, have actually 
been under buying pressure for a couple of years or more. In contrast, the EMPs for Hong 
Kong,  Sri  Lanka  and  Australia  have,  in  general,  been  at  positive  levels  prior  to  2008, 
suggesting  that  these  economies’  currencies  had  experienced  selling  pressures. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the year 2008 marked the period of heavy selling pressures for 
all the currencies of the economies included in our study. Furthermore, the EMP series, on 
average, peaked around the final quarter of 2008 --- around the period of the Lehman 
Brothers’  collapse.    In  2009,  the  EMP  levels  have  turned  negative,  suggesting  that  the 
SEACEN currencies have largely been under buying pressure.  The buying/appreciation 
pressure continued during most parts of 2010 and early 2011, as shown by the persistence 
of negative EMP levels for the SEACEN economies (Figures 11). 
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Exchange Market Pressure Index (cont’d) 
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4.3  Stock Exchange Index 
 
The rapid rise of the stock market indices of SEACEN economies, particularly in 
Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka has also induced anxiety over the return of an asset price 
bubble  in  the  region  (Figure  12).  By  December  2010,  the  annualised  returns  of  the 
Indonesian and Thai stock exchanges reached a staggering rate of around 50 per cent.  
Bursa  Malaysia  (formerly  known  as  Kuala  Lumpur  Stock  Exchange  (KLSE))  has  also 
reported strong market capitalisation with an annual return of close to 27 per cent. The 
return of political stability has brought about market confidence in the local capital market 
of Sri Lanka and this can be seen from the steep rising trend in the stock exchange index. 
From  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  to  early  2011,  the  index  of  Sri  Lanka’s  stock 
exchange experienced a 400 per cent increase. Strong gains have also been reported in the 
stock exchanges of Korea and Chinese Taipei. In contrast, there have been much more 
subdued profit-taking activities in the stock exchanges of developed economies such as US, 
UK and Japan. The UK FTSE 100 only increased, in US dollar terms, by a mere 0.5 per cent 
in December 2010 from the level in December 2009. Nepal was the only economy that 
reported a bearish trend in the domestic stock exchange market. In general, the strong 
returns in the stock markets continued to be felt during the first quarter of 2011, albeit at a 
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Figure 12 
Monthly Regional Stock Market Index (January 2005 – May 2011) 
 
 












































Source: CEIC Database. 
 
 
4.4  House Prices 
 
Another frequently debated concern associated with the strong capital inflows is the 
potential bubble in housing price. In its recent survey of 50 economies around the globe, 
Knight Frank (2011) found that the global house price increased by only less than 2 per 
cent annually in the first quarter of 2011. In regional terms, the same survey has found that 
Asia experienced the most drastic rise in housing prices during the first three months of 
2011 (Table 5). The region recorded an 8.4 per cent growth over the last twelve months, 
down  from  the  17.8  per  cent  reported  a  year  earlier.  The  weakest  region  was  North 
America which saw a fall of 0.4 per cent in value, largely driven by a contraction of almost 5 
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The same survey by Knight Frank (2011) has also listed Hong Kong as the economy 
experiencing the highest annual rate of price increase during the first quarter of 2011. 
House prices in Hong Kong have risen by more than 24 per cent within a year. Government 
officials including Chief Executive Donald Tsang had warned of an asset bubble in Hong 
Kong, where home prices have surged more than 70 per cent since the beginning of 2009 
(Balfour (2011)). In the most recent measures to curb prices, announced in 10 June 2011, 
the government raised up-front payments for properties costing more than HK$6 million 
($770,000) and required borrowers, whose income is primarily from outside Hong Kong, to 
deposit an extra 10 per cent when they buy properties unless they can demonstrate a 
“close connection” to the city. As a result, the Hang Seng Property Index has declined 12 per 
cent in June 2011, while the benchmark Hang Seng Index is down 6.2 per cent (Balfour 
(2011)). 
 
Of  the  50  listed  economies,  four  Asian  economies  were  among  the  top  5 
experiencing the most price increases in their housing markets. Overall, 6 Asian economies 
were among the top 15 economies in the Knight Frank House Price List. In addition to Hong 
Kong, other Asian economies experiencing significant house price increases are Chinese 
Taipei, Singapore, China, Malaysia and Indonesia. It  should also be noted that recently, 
house  prices  in  Hong  Kong,  Chinese  Taipei  and  China  continue  to  experience  strong 
growths, despite the significant increases that had already taken place in 2010. This is in 
direct contrast to Europe where Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain continue to struggle to 
contain the downward spiral in the domestic housing prices. 
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Table 5 
Knight Frank Housing Price Index 





Latest Data if 
not Q1 2011 
1  Hong Kong  Asia Pacific  24.2%  14.1%    
2  India  Asia Pacific  21.9%  14.1%  Q4 2010 
3 
Chinese 
Taipei  Asia Pacific  14.3%  6.9%    
4  Israel  Middle East  12.1%  5.3%    
5  Singapore  Asia Pacific  10.5%  3.5%    
6  France  Europe  8.7%  1.7%    
7  Poland  Europe  8.5%  0.2%    
8  China*  Asia Pacific  8.4%  6.8%    
9  Norway  Europe  8.2%  4.9%    
10  Malaysia  Asia Pacific  6.4%  1.4%    
11  Belgium  Europe  5.9%  5.6%  Q4 2010 
12  Switzerland  Europe  5.1%  3.3%    
13  Latvia  Europe  5.1%  -2.1%    
14  Indonesia  Asia Pacific  4.5%  2.9%    
15  Slovenia  Europe  4.3%  6.1%    
16  Denmark  Europe  4.1%  -1.1%  Q4 2010 
17  Canada 
North 
America  4.1%  0.7%    
18  Finland  Europe  3.9%  1.3%    
19  Turkey  Europe  3.5%  2.8%    
20  Iceland  Europe  3.4%  2.1%    
21  Colombia 
South 
America  3.3%  5.4%  Q4 2010 
22  Jersey  Europe  2.9%  -1.6%    
23  Luxembourg  Europe  2.6%  0.1%  Q4 2010 
24  Austria  Europe  2.4%  2.9%    
25  Estonia  Europe  2.1%  2.7%    
26  Sweden  Europe  2.1%  -0.7%    
27  Germany  Europe  1.3%  -0.1%    
28  Australia  Asia Pacific  -0.2%  -0.9%    
29 
United 
Kingdom  Europe  -0.2%  -0.5%    
30  South Africa  Africa  -1.3%  1.9%    
31  Italy  Europe  -1.4%  -0.6%  Q4 2010 
32  Portugal  Europe  -1.8%  1.0%    
33  New Zealand  Asia Pacific  -1.8%  0.6%    
34  Malta  Europe  -2.0%  -2.5%  Q4 2010 
 




Knight Frank Global House Price Index, Q1 2011 Results (cont’d) 
Rank  Economies  Region 
Annual  % 
Change 
Six-Monthly  % 
Change 
Latest  Data  if 
not Q1 2011 
35 
Slovak 
Republic  Europe  -2.5%  -3.1%    
36  Netherlands  Europe  -2.6%  -2.2%    
37  Hungary  Europe  -2.7%  -4.5%  Q4 2010 
38 
Czech 
Republic  Europe  -3.5%  -2.6%    
39  Japan  Asia Pacific  -3.6%  -1.6%  Q3 2010 
40  Croatia  Europe  -3.8%  -1.0%  Q4 2010 
41  Lithuania  Europe  -4.0%  -0.2%  Q4 2010 





America  -4.9%  -3.7%    
44  Bulgaria  Europe  -5.6%  -3.8%    
45  Greece  Europe  -5.7%  -0.4%    
46  Ukraine  Europe  -7.5%  -1.6%  Q3 2010 
47  Dubai, UAE  Middle East  -8.2%  2.1%    
48  Ireland  Europe  -11.9%  -6.9%    
49  Russia  Europe  -13.9%  -13.6%    
50  Cyprus**  Europe  NA  -4.4%  Q4 2010 
 
Source: Knight Frank (2011). 
 
 
4.5  Undue Concern of the Financial Sector 
 
Based on the survey conducted for the SEACEN member banks, it was inferred that 
the volatile and strong surge of capital movements has raised concerns on the stability and 
strength of the financial sector. Selected key financial indicators that we have gathered, 
however, do not seem to corroborate the fear. Looking at Table 6 on the capital adequacy 
ratio, the banking system of the reporting economies continue to be well above the Basel III 
requirements, even during the peak of the sub-prime financial crisis. In general, the ratios 
improved  in  2009  and  were  well  maintained  in  2010.  By  the  end of  2010,  the  capital 
adequacy ratio was averaging around 15 per cent, substantially above the proposed Basel 









Bank Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
(In percent) 
                         2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Q12011   
                     
 
Australia  10.2  10.3  10.1  11.3  11.9  11.4  11.5 
 
 
Hong Kong   14.8  14.9  13.4  14.8  16.9  15.9  - 
 
 
Indonesia  20.5  21.5  20.2  17.5  17.8  16.2  - 
 
 
Japan  12.5  13.3  12.3  12.4  15.8  16.7Sep/  - 
 
 
Korea  13.0  12.8  12.3  12.3  14.4  14.6  - 
 
 
Malaysia  15.1  14.7  14.8  16.1  18.2  17.5  16.3 
 
 
Philippines  17.7  17.6  15.7  14.6  15.4  16.7  16.7 
 
 
Singapore  15.8  15.4  13.5  14.7  17.3  18.6  17.8 
 
 
Thailand  13.2  13.6  14.8  13.9  15.8  16.0  - 
                        Source: Financial Soundness Indicators, IMF   
 
 
Profitability  of  financial  industries  of  the  SEACEN  economies,  particularly  the 
banking sector, has indeed taken a beating during the peak of the global financial crisis in 
2007-2008 (Table 7). However, the financial firms continued to report relatively robust 
profitability, except for Japan. This is a sharp contrast to the experience of the 1997 East 
Asian  financial  crisis  for  some  of  the  SEACEN  economies.  General  strengthening  in 
profitability rate took place in 2009 and 2010. Similarly, the quality of loans remained high 
and did not seem to be affected by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Table 8). Even 
at the peak of the sub-prime global financial crisis, the non-performing loans did not go 
beyond 5 per cent of total loans. 
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Table 7 
 Return on Equity of Selected SEG Economies 
(In percent) 
                       2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Q12011 
                   
 
Australia1  25.6  27.8  30.2  18.9  17.4  20.5  - 
 
Hong Kong   19.1  19.8  25.1  13.9  16.7  16.7  - 
 
Indonesia  23.1  27.1  27.8  23.9  26.3  26.1  - 
 
Japan2  10.9  8.5  6.1  -6.9  4.7 
8.3Sep
/  - 
 
Korea3  18.4  14.6  14.6  7.2  5.8  7.3  - 
 
Malaysia  15.7  16.9  19.2  17.6  13.4  16.3  19.0 
 
Philippine
s  8.8  10.6  10.7  10.0  15.4  16.7  14.2 
 
Singapore  11.2  13.7  12.9  11.7  10.8  15.5  17.2 
 
Thailand3  14.7  8.2  1.2  9.7  8.5  10.0  - 
                             
Sources: Financial Soundness Indicators, IMF 
Note: Data definitions follow, to the extent possible, the methodology of the Financial Soundness Indicators 
Compilation Guide. Major deviations from this methodology are indicated in economy specific footnotes. Due 
to differences in consolidation methods, national accounting, taxation, and supervisory regimes, data are not 
strictly comparable across economies. 
Numerator: Annualised net income before extraordinary items and taxes, from the beginning of the year 
until the reporting month. 
Denominator: Average value of capital over the same period.  
                    1  Accumulated income of the last 12 months. 
2  Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to the end of the fiscal year, i.e., March of the next 
calendar year. 
3  After extraordinary items and taxes. 
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Table 8 
Non-performing Loans to Total Loans (in %) 
(In percent) 
                       2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Q12011 
 
Australia1  0.6  0.6  0.6  1.3  2.0  2.2  2.2 
 
Hong Kong 2  1.4  1.1  0.8  1.2  1.6  0.8  - 
 
Indonesia  7.6  6.1  4.1  3.2  3.3  2.5  - 
 
Japan3  1.8  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.7  1.8Sep/  - 
 
Korea4  1.2  0.8  0.7  1.1  1.2  1.9  - 
 
Malaysia5  9.4  8.5  6.5  4.8  3.6  3.4  3.2 
 
Philippines6,7  10.0  7.5  5.8  3.9  3.5  3.4  3.5 
 
Singapore8  3.8  2.8  1.5  1.4  2.0  1.4  1.3 
  Thailand  9.1  8.1  7.9  5.7  5.3  3.9  - 
Sources: Financial Soundness Indicators, IMF 
Note: Data definitions follow, to the extent possible, the methodology of the Financial Soundness Indicators 
Compilation Guide. Major deviations from this methodology are indicated in economy specific footnotes. Due 
to differences in consolidation methods, national accounting, taxation, and supervisory regimes, data are not 
strictly comparable across economies. 
Numerator: Gross value of loans on which (1) payments of principal and interest is past due by 90 days or 
more, or (2) interest payments equal to 90 days interest or more have been capitalized, refinanced, or rolled 
over, and (3) loans less than 90 days past due, that are recognized as nonperforming under national 
supervisory guidance. 
Denominator: The total value of the loan portfolio (including nonperforming loans, and before the deduction 
of specific loan loss provisions). 
1  Includes both impaired and past due items. 
  2  Loans classified as substandard, doubtful, and loss; not necessarily linked to a 90-day criterion. 
  3  For 9 major banks only. Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to the end of the fiscal year, i.e.,  
March of the next calendar year. 
4  Loans classified as substandard, doubtful, and loss; not necessarily linked to a 90-day criterion. 
  5  Loans with principal and/or interest past over 180 days; credit card debt and bankers’ acceptances past over 90 days;  
loans secured by cash and cash substitutes past 365 days. 
6  Thirty days for loans payable in lump sum or payable in quarterly, semi-annual, or annual installments;  
90 days for loans payable in monthly installments; 
7  Interbank loans are excluded. 
  8  Other characteristics may be considered beyond the 90-day past-due criterion to classify a loan as 
nonperforming. 
   
 
5.   Policy Measures 
 
With  the  strong  surges  in  capital  flows  into most  SEACEN  economies,  the  main 
challenge  for  the  central  bank  is  to  remain  consistent  with  its  mandates  of  price  and 
financial  stability  while  being  mindful  of  the  opportunities  as  well  as  the  risks 
accompanying these flows, especially with the mounting excess liquidity in the domestic 
market. Obviously, this is easier said than done. The task of policy tightening has been 
complicated by the strong and persistent surge of capital inflows. A number of common 
and overriding objectives of these policies can be summarised as follows. To start with, 
policy makers are aware of the benefits and the need to attract these flows and convert 40 
 
them into stable sources of funding with manageable levels of risk. In most, if not all of the 
SEACEN  economies,  these  funding  are  urgently  needed  to  finance  the  much-needed 
infrastructure projects to support overall development programs in the economy. Hence, 
converting capital into a more medium-to-long term financing is a challenge shared by 
most of the SEACEN economies. 
 
In a more short-term perspective, one key consideration in the face of strong capital 
flows would be their implications on asset prices, inflation and inflation expectations. A 
surge  in  capital  inflows  may  lead  to  liquidity  expansion  which  could  have  inflationary 
consequences. Similarly, these inflows could also affect the exchange rate which, in turn, 
affects the prices of commodities. Hence, balancing long-term objectives with short-term 
concerns have been the principle challenges. The next several sub-sections summarize and 
highlight  major  strategies  and  corresponding  policy  measures  implemented  during  the 
past two years by the central banks and monetary authorities of the SEACEN economies. 
More importantly, more often than not, each of the policy measures come with trade-offs or 
potential cost that must be weighed in. 
 
 
5.1  Balancing Objectives and Trade-offs: Managing the Impossible Trinity 
 
Strong and persistent surge of capital inflows have undoubtedly complicated the 
conventional  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy.  As  the  following  sub-sections  will 
demonstrate, the authorities of the SEACEN economies had to resort to all types of policy 
measures, both macro and micro policies, and balance the trade-offs. These difficult policy 
choices  and  trade-offs  are  driven  by  one  of  the  key  principles  of  international  macro-
finance: the Impossible Trinity. This principle basically argues that if policy makers want to 
maintain monetary independence while managing exchange rate movements, they need to 
sacrifice capital mobility. 
 
  5.1.1 Interest Rate Adjustments 
 
Interest rate policy has remained one of the primary policy instrument choices to 
manage price and financial stability in the domestic economies. With the return of capital 
surges, all SEG economies have resorted to a number of interest rate hikes in 2010 and 
2011.  Frequent  interest  rate  adjustments  have,  in  fact,  been  more  of  a  norm  than  an 
exception since 2010. People’s Bank of China, for instance, has raised interest rates several 
times during the first half of 2011 alone (Table 9). Similarly, Bank of Thailand, considered 
among the more hawkish central banks in the region, increased its benchmark interest rate 
by about 25 basis points to 3.25 per cent in July 2011. This latest adjustment was the sixth 
hike  announced  by  Bank  of  Thailand  from  mid  of  2010  to  July  2011.Yet,  as  discussed 
before, inflationary pressure remains relentless. In May 2011, the annual inflation in China 
has already reached around 5.5 per cent, the highest annualised inflation in 34 months. 
Interest rate adjustment has proven to have limited effectiveness, especially in addressing 
excess liquidity and potential asset price bubbles in various sectors of the economies, such 




Recent Interest Rate Adjustments 
 
 
Mar-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
BI benchmark reference rate 6.75 *
CBSL repurchase rate 7.0 *
BOT 1-day repurchase bond 2.5 * 25 anchoring inflationary pressure
BOK 7-day repurchase rate 3.0 * 25
SBV rediscount rate 12.0 * 500
rate of recapitalizing banks 12.0 * 100 Two-year high Inflation
PBC required reserve ratio 20.0 * 50 3rd increase of the year
BSP reverse repurchase facility 4.25 * 25 inflationary pressure
repurchase faciliity rate 6.25 * 25
CBC discount rate 1.75 * 12.5 inflationary pressure
secure loan rate 2.125 * 12.5
unsecured loan 4.0 * 12.5
Others
RBA cash rate 4.75 *
BOJ overnight call rate 0.1 *
expansion of asset purchase program of 5 
trillion yen
HKMA base rate 0.5
FED Res interest rate 0-2.5 * no change in QEII at US$600 billion
Apr-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
PBC 1 year lending rate 6.31 * 25 inflationary pressure
1 year deposit rate 3.25 * 25
SBV reserve ratio on USD deposits  3-6 * 200 Infllation rate was 13.9% in March
reserve ratio for non-term US$ 
deposit 6.0 * 200
refinance rate 14.0 * 100
discount rate 13.0 * 100 annual inflation was 17.51 % in April
refinance rate 15.0 * 100
BOK 7-day repurchase rate 3.0 *
BI key  interest rate 6.75 *
CBSL statutory reserve ratio (rupee) 8.0 * 100 inflation was 8.6% in March
repurchase rate 7.0 *
reverse repurchase rate 8.5 *
PBC required reserve ratio 20.5 * 50
average for larger banks; report of higher 
inflation
BOT 1-day bond repurcahse rate 2.75 * 25 inflationary concerns
Others
US Fed Fed Fund 0-0.25 *
HKMA base rate 0.5 *
RBA cash rate 4.75 *
BOJ overnight call rate 0-0.1 *





Mar-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
BI benchmark reference rate 6.75 *
CBSL repurchase rate 7.0 *
BOT 1-day repurchase bond 2.5 * 25 anchoring inflationary pressure
BOK 7-day repurchase rate 3.0 * 25
SBV rediscount rate 12.0 * 500
rate of recapitalizing banks 12.0 * 100 Two-year high Inflation
PBC required reserve ratio 20.0 * 50 3rd increase of the year
BSP reverse repurchase facility 4.25 * 25 inflationary pressure
repurchase faciliity rate 6.25 * 25
CBC discount rate 1.75 * 12.5 inflationary pressure
secure loan rate 2.125 * 12.5
unsecured loan 4.0 * 12.5
Others
RBA cash rate 4.75 *
BOJ overnight call rate 0.1 *
expansion of asset purchase program of 5 
trillion yen
HKMA base rate 0.5
FED Res interest rate 0-2.5 * no change in QEII at US$600 billion
Apr-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
PBC 1 year lending rate 6.31 * 25 inflationary pressure
1 year deposit rate 3.25 * 25
SBV reserve ratio on USD deposits  3-6 * 200 Infllation rate was 13.9% in March
reserve ratio for non-term US$ 
deposit 6.0 * 200
refinance rate 14.0 * 100
discount rate 13.0 * 100 annual inflation was 17.51 % in April
refinance rate 15.0 * 100
BOK 7-day repurchase rate 3.0 *
BI key  interest rate 6.75 *
CBSL statutory reserve ratio (rupee) 8.0 * 100 inflation was 8.6% in March
repurchase rate 7.0 *
reverse repurchase rate 8.5 *
PBC required reserve ratio 20.5 * 50
average for larger banks; report of higher 
inflation
BOT 1-day bond repurcahse rate 2.75 * 25 inflationary concerns
Others
US Fed Fed Fund 0-0.25 *
HKMA base rate 0.5 *
RBA cash rate 4.75 *
BOJ overnight call rate 0-0.1 *





   
May-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
BSP overnight borrowing rate 4.5 * 25
overnight lending rate 6.5 * 25
BNM overnight policy rate 3.0 * 25
statutory reserve ratio  3.0 * 100
BI Benchmark rate 6.75 *
PBC statutory reserve ratio  21.0 * 50 21% for large banks and 19% for smaller bank
BOK 7-day repurchase rate 3.0 *
CBSL repurchase rate 7.0 *
reverse repurchase 8.0 *
reserve ratio 0.5 *
Others
RBA cash rate 4.75 *
Boj overnight call rate 0-0.1 *
Jun-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
SBV reverse repo 15 * 100 Inflation was 17.51 %  in April
BOT 1-day bond repurchase rate 3 *
BI benchmark rate 6.75 *
BOK 7-day repurchase rate 3.25 * 25 inflationary expectation
CBSL repurchase rate 7 *
Reverse repo 8.5 *
PBC reserve requirement 21.5 * 50 inflation expectation
BSP overnight borrowing rate 4.5 *
overnight lending rate 6.5 *
CBC discount rate 1.875 * 25
collateralized loan rate 2.25 * 12.5
unsecured loan rate 4.125 * 12.5
Others
RBA cash rate 4.75 *
BOJ overnight call rate 0-0.1 *
extended loan program, a new 500 billion yen 
lending facility





Table  9  also  clearly  demonstrates  the  set  of  balancing  acts  that  the  monetary 
authorities must consider when implementing the rate adjustments. Absorbing liquidity to 
manage  inflationary  pressure  on  the  one  hand,  while  at  the  same  time  maintaining  a 
growth  conducive  environment,  had  been  the  core  objectives  of  these  measures.  In 
Jul-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
SBV OMO interest rate 15 * 100
PBC 1-year benchmark 6.31 * 25
1-year deposit rate 3.25 * 25
BNM overnight policy rate 3 *
Statutory Reserve Requirement 4 * 100
CBSL repurchase rate 7 *
BI Reference rate 6.75 *
BOT 1-day bond repurchase 3.25 * 25
BOK 7-day repurchase rate 3.25 *
CBC minimum liquidity ratio 10 * 300
 (effective oct 2011): strengthen risk 
management
BSP Overnight borrowing rate 4.5 *
overnight lending rate 6.5 *
reserve requirement 21 * 100 effective 5 August 2011
Aug-11 Policy Rate % Hold Increase Decrease % Increase (BP) Remarks
SEACEN CB
PBC
ban on mainland-based companies directly 
borrowing renminbi-denominated loans from 
foreign banks
RBA cash rate 4.75 *
BOJ overnight call rate 0-0.1 *
extended loan program, a new 500 billion yen 
lending facility
BI reference rate 6.75 *
BOK 7-day repurchase Rate 3.25 *
CBSL benchmark repurchase rate 7 *
reverse repurchase 8.5 *
statutory reserve ratio 8 *
BOT 1-day bond repurchase 3.5 * 25
SBV
non term foreign currency deposit 
and deposit less than 12 months 8 * 100
for most state-owned commercial banks, joint 
stock banks, 100 percent foreign owned banks, 
joint venture banks, and foreign bank 
branches.  Ratio also increased for other 
institutions.
Others
US Fed fed funds\ rate 0-0.25 *
August 5, US downgraded to AA+ from AAA by 
Standand & Poor's
HKMA base interest rate 0.5 *
Source: www.centralbanknews.info45 
 
addition, ranges of liquidity management instruments have been adopted, both market 
rates and direct instruments, such as reserve requirement.  Managing monetary aggregate 
stability in a volatile and liquid market has also  been a challenge for most of SEACEN 
central banks/monetary authorities. This is particularly true for some of these economies 
that adopt a monetary targeting regime. It has often been the case that the central banks 
have to actively conduct open market operations, including in the overnight market, to 
absorb  the  excess  liquidity.  In  Sri Lanka,  the  central  bank  has  also  engaged  in  foreign 
exchange swap agreements with the commercial banks to mop the excess liquidity. 
 
Similar issues are also faced by the inflation targeting economies. While they remain 
strong advocates of the inflation targeting policy, the central banks of Australia, Indonesia, 
Korea, Philippines and Thailand have given heightened attention to asset price movements, 
beyond  just  headline  and  core  inflation,  by  tracking  various  financial  and  asset  price 
indicators  to  ensure  that  they  can  spot  the  emergence  of  medium-term  risks  to 
macroeconomic  stability,  and  act  preemptively  to  ward  off  potential  threats  to  price 
stability. 
 
  5.1.2 Foreign Exchange Market Intervention   
 
The challenge of dealing with the impossible trinity under strong surges of capital 
flows is most felt in the foreign exchange market. Under buying/appreciation pressures, 
central  banks  around  the  world  have  been  actively  implementing  varying  degrees  of 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets to dampen rapid appreciations of the local 
currency.  Traditionally,  among  the  emerging  markets,  including  SEACEN  economies, 
foreign exchange intervention is sterilised. This sterilisation effort is needed to manage the 
level  of  excess  liquidity  and  domestic  money  supply.  Hence,  potential  sterilised 
intervention could reduce the appreciation pressure on the exchange rate and in some 
parts help manage overheating of the economy that unsterilised intervention may induce. 
 
Active sterilised foreign exchange interventions have been evidently illustrated by 
the  strong  reserve  accumulations  reported  by  a  number  of  SEACEN  central 
banks/monetary authorities (Figure 13). Indonesia and Thailand, among economies that 
have experienced strong surges of portfolio capital since the second half 2009, accumulated 
foreign exchange reserves averaging around US$28 billion in 2010. In fact, Bank Indonesia 
accumulated an estimated US$18.5 billion in foreign reserves from February to April 2011, 
a three-month record that put total reserves at an all-time high of US$113.8 billion. Similar 
trends  are  also  reported  in  a  number  of  emerging  SEACEN  markets.  Mongolia,  driven 
largely by the commodity boom, has seen its foreign exchange reserve position almost 
triple from January 2009 to end of 2010. With the return of political stability and security, 
Sri Lanka has seen its reserves triple within a period of less than 2 years.  
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Figure 13 




Sterilised intervention has, in general, been found to be fiscally very expensive as 
the domestic central banks/monetary authorities are forced to earn a lower interest rate 
on the foreign currency reserves that it purchases than it pays on the sterilised bonds of 
central bank securities issued in the sterilisation process. These quasi-fiscal costs (roughly 
equal to the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign economies multiplied 
by the rise in foreign exchange reserves) can be quite high and damaging to the balance 
sheet of the central bank.  The magnitude of these quasi-fiscal costs can vary from as high 
as an average of around US$4.8 billion in the case of China for the period of 2009 to mid-
2011  to  an  average  of  US$22  million  in  the  case  of  Mongolia  for  the  same  period.  In 
between  these  respective  upper-and  lower  bound  estimates  are  quasi-fiscal  costs  that 
reached as high on average of around US$677 million, US$359 million and US$248 million 
in the case of Indonesia, Korea and Chinese Taipei, respectively (Figure 14).  
 
Nonetheless, due to the sheer size of international reserves accumulated by these 
economies  prior  to  and  over  the  same  period,  when  these  costs  are  assessed  as  a 
proportion of average total reserves, China’s quasi-fiscal costs only amounted to an average 
of  0.19  per  cent  of  average  total  reserves  for  the  same  period  of  2009  to  mid-2011. 
Moreover,  the  quasi-fiscal  costs  in  the  case  of  Indonesia,  Korea  and  Chinese  Taipei 












































China SEACEN excludes China
Source: IMF CDRom, July 2011and CEIC Database
1/ Include Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Chines Taipei and Thailand.47 
 
respectively. In contrast, in the particular case of Mongolia, this translated to a little higher 
average quasi-fiscal cost of around 2.05 per cent for the same period. The cost of holding 
reserves is, however, more alarming when we look at them as the share of the export 
revenue of the economy. For Indonesia, for instance, the cost of intervention was about 7 
per cent of total export revenues in 2010. Perhaps the more important argument, however, 
is that in most cases, especially under the persistent and massive surge of capital inflows, 
central banks/monetary authorities are not in the position to fully sterilise the market let 
alone the capacity of fiscal and monetary authorities in Asian economies to viably absorb 
these  estimated  quasi-fiscal  costs.  Furthermore,  sterilised  intervention  also  does  not 
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Source: CEIC Database and Authors’ Own Estimates. 
 
 
In some of the SEACEN economies, such as Indonesia and Chinese Taipei, policy 
concerns have also been raised on the significant share of central bank securities being 
held  by  the  foreign  investors/banks.  Since  November  2010,  the  amount  of  outright 
purchase of Chinese Taipei government bonds by foreign investors is being counted toward 





























reduce  short-term  volatility  associated  with  the  strong  surges  of  capital  flows,  Bank 
Indonesia (BI) introduced a one-month holding period for its certificate (SBI) purchased in 
both primary and secondary markets in June 2010. Prior to this, BI launched a concerted 
effort to shift the maturity structure from one-month to 3- and 6-month tenors and from 
weekly to monthly auction. Longer maturity SBIs ---SBI-9 months and SBI-12 months--- are 
being considered in late 2010 with the purported aim of lengthening the maturity profile of 
investors. 
 
Given the high cost and, non-sustainability of active intervention and sterilisation, 
allowing more flexibility and higher appreciation of the local currency against most major 
currencies  has  been  one  alternative  strategy  adopted  by  the  authorities.  This  measure 
allows the exchange rate to adjust more flexibly to absorb the surge in capital inflows while 
reducing the need to intervene in the foreign exchange market. Singapore, for instance, has 
employed  the  trade-weighted  based  exchange  rate  policy  approach  as  a  key  monetary 
policy tool. This exchange rate framework provides the flexibility for absorbing transient 
volatility  associated  with  short-term  capital  flows.  In  addition,  a  number  of  SEACEN 
economies,  such  as  Malaysia,  the  Philippines  and  Thailand,  have  made  it  easier  for 
domestic residents to invest abroad. Easy access to foreign investments has long been one 
prescribed measure to mitigate the impact of capital inflows on the domestic economy. 
 
 
5.2  Macro-prudential Measures 
 
As elaborated above, the effectiveness of conventional monetary and exchange rate 
policies have been found to be rather limited. A clear concern is that while interest rate 
policy  has  become  impotent  to  contain  asset  bubbles,  it  has  a  much  wider  adverse 
consequence  on  other  productive  sectors  of  the  economies,  such  as  agriculture  and 
manufacturing. The strategies to mix conventional monetary and exchange rate policies 
with more micro-prudential measures targeting macroeconomic objectives, or also known 
as macro-prudential measures, have been widely adopted by the authorities of the SEACEN 
economies (Table 10). In the second half 2009 and first half 2010,these macro-prudential 
measures have frequently been adopted to supplement macroeconomic policy measures by 
the SEACEN authorities to gradually shift away from the generally expansionary policy 
stances during the peak of sub-prime crisis. The primary objectives of the recent macro-
prudential  measures  are  to  manage  pro-cyclicality,  to  reduce  interconnectivity  and 
systemic risks and to place “sand in the wheel” and slowdown the capital inflows.  
 
Concerns for the persistent surges of capital inflows and too rapid increase in rates 
further  widening  interest  rate  disparities  discussed  earlier  and  hence  attracting  more 
inflows of capital, have forced central banks of the SEACEN economies to employ a multiple 
set  of  policies  to  supplement  the  conventional  interest  rate  policy.  In  some  SEACEN 
economies,  a  mix  of  interest  rate  hikes  and  reserve  requirement  has  frequently  been 
adopted. People’s Bank of China has, for instance, increased the reserve requirement ratio 
six times in the first half of 2011 alone. Other central banks, such as Bank Negara Malaysia, 
Bank Indonesia, Bank of Mongolia, Central Bank of Sri Lanka and Central Bank, Chinese 50 
 
Taipei, to name a few, have also adopted a similar strategy more than once during the past 
12 months. 
 
A combination of loan to deposit ratio and reserve requirement policy has been 
enforced by Bank Indonesia, for instance, to manage credit growth and risk taking in the 
domestic banking sector. A key objective of the Singapore government, for example, is to 
ensure  a  stable  and  sustainable  property  market  where  prices  move  in  line  with 
fundamentals. In February 2010, the Loan-to-Value (LTV) limit for housing loans extended 
by financial institutions was lowered to 80 pe rcent. To discourage speculative flipping of 
properties, a Seller’s Stamp Duty on all residential properties bought and sold within 1 year 
was introduced. In August 2010, the holding period for the imposition of the Seller’s Stamp 
Duty was increased from one year to three years. The Singapore government also tightened 
measures to ensure public housing is utilised as intended, i.e. for owner occupation. To deal 
with the “hot” property sector, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has lowered the Loan-
to-Value (LTV) ratio for property mortgages and imposed different LTV ratios for residents 
and non-residents.  51 
 
Table 10 
 Selected Implemented Macro-prudential Regulations 
Member banks  Macroprudential  policies  taken  (or 
macroprudential tools used) 
Purpose of policy / tools 
AMBD  Establishment of a mandatory deposit protection 
scheme 
To restore and sustain depositor confidence in the financial system 
post  
GFC and to strengthen the financial system infrastructure. 
  Establishment of a Credit Information Bureau.  •  Strengthening of the Financial system infrastructure and enhancing 
credit risk assessment and management(CRM) across all banks.  
•  To ensure greater discipline by both borrowers and banks in the 
disbursement of credit and contribute to the decline in household 
debt. 
  Restrictions on credit cards and on 
personal/consumption financing. 
•  To reduce the incidence of household debt in the economy and to 
ensure more productive allocation of credit in the economy to aid the 
economic diversification programme of the government away from 
oil and gas. 
•  To enhance the access to credit for SMEs and to foster expanded SME 
financing. 
PBC  Adopting dynamic differentiated reserve 
management ratio(RRR) adjustment, namely, 
requesting banks to adopt differentiated RRR 
based on the divergence of credit to economic 
and price growth, and on the systemic 
importance and soundness of the bank. 
To improve monetary policy instruments, to combine quantitative  
adjustment on liquidity management and counter-cyclical macro- 
prudential policy framework, and to enhance the flexibility and  
effectiveness of macro-management. 
  To introduce total social financing as interim 
variable of monetary policy. 
To cooperate with traditional management tools including credit  
management, and to increase the effectiveness of financial macro- 
management. 
HKMA  Measures applicable to owner occupied 
residential property mortgage loans only 
 
•  For properties with a value at HK$10 
million or above, the maximum LTV 
ratio shall be 50%; 
•  For properties with a value at HK$7 
million or above but below HK$10 
million, the maximum LTV ratio shall be 
60%, subject to a maximum loan 
amount of HK$5 million; 
To introduce prudential measures for mortgage lending to address 
the  
increasing risk to the stability of the Hong Kong banking system. 52 
 
•  For properties with a value below HK$7 
million, the maximum LTV ratio shall be 
70%, subject to a maximum loan 




Measures applicable to residential and  
non-residential property mortgage loans 
 
•  Reducing the applicable maximum LTV 
ratio by 10 percentage points for all 
property mortgages to borrowers 
whose income is derived mainly from 
outside Hong Kong. However, 
borrowers who can demonstrate having 
a close connection with Hong Kong (e.g. 
those who are on secondment by a local 
employer to work outside Hong Kong 
with documentary proof provided by 
the employer or those who have their 
immediate family members residing in 
Hong Kong) will not be subject to the 
LTV reduction; and 
•  Lowering the maximum LTV ratio for 
property mortgage loans based on 
borrowers’ net worth (i.e. net worth-
based mortgage loans) from 50% to 
40% 
•  irrespective of the value of the 
properties. In view of the difficulties in 
verifying borrowers’ net worth 
regularly, it is considered prudent to 
lower the maximum LTV ratio. 
BI  Comprehensive mix of central bank instruments 
including central bank bills, term deposits, and 
lengthening tenor of central bank facilities 
To manage capital inflows and deepen financial market instruments 
  LDR-linked statutory reserves  To mitigate systemic liquidity risks while stimulating bank 
intermediation 53 
 














Implementation of a maximum LTV ratio of 70%, 
applicable to the third house financing facility 
taken out by a borrower. (Nov 2010) 
 
Increase in risk weights for residential 
mortgages and personal financing under the 
Standardized Approach (SA) for credit risk (Feb 
2011): 
•  Risk weight for performing residential 
mortgages with a LTV ratio>90% increased 
from 75% to 100%; 
Risk weight for performing term loans extended 
for personal use with an original maturity of > 5 
years increased from 75% to 100%. 
•  To moderate excessive investment and speculative activity in certain 
pockets of the residential property market which has resulted in 
higher than average price increases in such locations while 
continuing to support a stable and sustainable property market, and 
promote the continued affordability of homes for the general public. 
•  To ensure the capital framework better reflects the higher risk 
profile and actual loss experience of higher loan-to-value mortgage 









  To ensure adequacy of security 
  Ceiling on Real estate exposure  To reduce sectoral concentration risk and allocate financial 
resources to  
productive sectors 







Regular coordinated industry stress testing 
exercise with banks, finance companies and 
insurers. 
Part of ongoing assessment of financial stability, potential risks to 
financial  
institutions’ soundness and the need for measures to enhance their  
financial resilience. 
• Lowering of LTV limits on residential 
property loans 
• Imposition of Seller’s Stamp Duty (SSD) for 
the sale of residential properties 
To maintain a stable and sustainable housing market. 
CBSL  Limits on banks’ exposure to stock market 
activities 
To require banks to adopt appropriate risk management standards 
to  
mitigate risks arising from possible volatility and price bubbles of 
assets. 
BOT  LTV ratio for residential mortgage  less than 10 
million baht  
(12 Nov 10)  
•  Higher risk weight for mortgage on 
high-rise building that has LTV greater than 
To preemptively avoid risk of asset price bubble in residential real 
estate  
markets although there is no obvious sign of asset price bubble. 54 
 
90% (effective on Jan 2011) 
•  Higher risk weight for mortgage on low-
rise building that has LTV greater than 95% 
(to be effective on Jan 2012) 
Note: For high value real estate (condominiums, 
lands, and houses for residence valued 10 million 
baht and over), BOT set the LTV limit at 70% in 
2003, and subsequently increased to 80% and 
impose higher risk weight capital charge for loan 
with LTV greater than 80% in 2009 
 
Source: Survey Conducted by The SEACEN Centre, June 2011. 
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Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has also enforced the Loan-to-Value ratio requirement 
as a tool to limit risk exposure of the banking sector to the real estate sector during the 
current  year.  To  moderate  any  excessive  investments  and  speculative  activity  in  the 
residential property market; effective from 3 November 2010, new housing loans approved 
by financial institutions and development financial institutions to borrowers who already 
hold two outstanding housing loan accounts, will be subject to a maximum Loan-to-Value 
(LTV) ratio of 70 per cent. The Adjustment LTV cap has also been pursued by the Bank of 
Thailand in recent years. 
 
To manage interconnectivity and risk exposure, Bank Indonesia, on the other hand, 
monitors daily liquidity positions of banks, especially those institutions that are expected 
to have more systemic implications. Commercial banks in Indonesia are also prohibited 
from extending loans to a single affiliated party by more than 10 per cent of the capital. 
Prohibition on complex derivative asset trading has also been enforced by a number of SEG 
central banks and monetary authorities. Nepal Rastra Bank, for instance, imposes limits on 
investments, except for government and central bank securities. Another typical prudential 
measure  to  manage  interconnectivity  is  limiting  sector  credit,  including  inter-bank 
placements. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka introduced the “Direction on Maximum Amount 
of Accommodation” regulation in 2007 with the main objective of limiting a bank’s credit 
exposure to any single individual or company or to any groups of individuals or companies. 
 
In November 2009, authorities in Korea imposed a set of tighter regulations on 
currency trading, including new standards for foreign exchange liquidity risk management, 
restrictions on currency forward transactions of non-financial companies, and mandatory 
minimum holdings of safe foreign currency assets by domestic banks. This set of policies 
followed an earlier move to curb speculative foreign exchange transactions. In July 2010, 
the minimum amount of deposits for foreign currency margin trade was raised to 5 per 
cent of transaction value from 2 per cent in an effort to clampdown on speculative foreign 
exchange trading by individual investors. Central Bank, Chinese Taipei have banned foreign 
investors  from  holding  NT$  time  deposits  with  domestic  financial  institutions  since 
November 2009. In addition, on 1 January 2011, the Central Bank, Chinese Taipei has also 
increased the required reserve ratio (RRR) of foreigners’ NT$ demand deposits from 9.775 
per cent to 90 per cent, if the outstanding balance of foreigners’ demand deposit exceeds 
that of 30 December 2010. Otherwise the RRR is increased to 25 per cent. 
 
 
5.3  Stepping up to Regional and Global Cooperation 
 
 
  5.3.1 Blanket Guarantee Coordination 
 
Past  and  recent  crisis  have  again  demonstrated  that  policy  cooperation  across 
different jurisdictions are also critical to enhance the effectiveness of various monetary, 
exchange rate and prudential measures in mitigating the impacts of the crisis and more 
importantly, position the economy into a stable economic recovery stage. In July 2009, the 
Hong  Kong  Monetary  Authority,  Bank  Negara  Malaysia  and  the  Monetary  Authority  of 56 
 
Singapore  announced  the  establishment  of  a  tripartite  working  group  to  map  out  a 
coordinated strategy for the scheduled exit from the full deposit guarantee of the banking 
system by the end of 2010 in their respective jurisdictions.  
 
 
5.3.2 Cross-border Supervision of Globalised Banking System 
 
Despite the growth of capital markets, the financial sector of the SEACEN region is 
dominated by the banking sector. As discussed in Section 2.3, foreign banks’ operations in 
emerging  markets  across  the  global  banking  system,  including  those  of  the  Asian 
economies,  increased  dramatically  starting  the  second  half of  the  1990s.  In  addition,  a 
recent survey carried out by The SEACEN Centre has identified a number of regional and 
global banks that have strong presence in major Asian economies (Siregar & Lim (2010). 
The  Hong  Kong  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation  (HSBC),  Citibank  and  the  Standard 
Chartered  Bank  are  among  the  three  major  international  banks  that  have  wide  and 
extensive branch networks in the Asian region. In addition to these three international 
powerhouses, the region has also witnessed the emergence of its own multinational banks. 
In  Malaysia,  banks  such  as  the  Malayan  Banking  Berhad  (Maybank),  Commerce 
International Merchant Bankers Berhad (CIMB) and Rashid Hussain Berhad (RHB) have 
expanded  their  networks  into  Southeast  Asian  and  beyond.  A  number  of  Singaporean 
banks, namely the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), the United Overseas Bank (UOB), 
and the Overseas Chinese Bank Corporation (OCBC) have achieved similar success in their 
efforts to become regional banks. 
 
Studies such as Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008 and 2010) illustrated the role of global 
banking system in transmitting monetary policy adjustments and adverse balance shocks 
across  borders.  In  their  2008  study,  Cetorelli  and  Goldberg  demonstrate  that  the 
globalsation  of  banking  in  the  United  States  is  influencing  the  monetary  transmission 
mechanism  both  domestically  and  externally.  Furthermore,  global  banks  played  a 
significant  role  in  the  transmission  of  the  2007  to  2009  crisis  to  emerging  market 
economies.  Cetorelli  and  Goldberg  (2010)  examine  the  relationships  between  adverse 
liquidity shocks on main advanced-country banking systems to emerging markets across 
Europe,  Asia,  and  Latin  America,  isolating loan  supply  from  loan  demand  effects.  Loan 
supply in emerging markets was significantly affected through three separate channels: a 
contraction in cross-border lending by foreign banks; a contraction in local lending by 
foreign banks’ affiliates in emerging markets; and a contraction in loan supply by domestic 
banks resulting from the funding shock to their balance sheet induced by the decline in 
interbank, cross-border lending.  
 
A vital area of policy cooperation, therefore, is on the supervision of the increasingly 
globalised banking systems and markets. The annual gathering of the Deputy Governors of 
the  SEACEN  Central  Banks  in-charge  of  Financial  Stability  has  been  initiated  in  Bali, 
Indonesia  in  2010.  The  second  annual  meeting  took  place  in  October  2011  in  the 
Philippines. At the initial stage, the focus has largely been on identifying the issues and 
challenges  facing  the  global  banking  system  in  the  region.  The  ASEAN  central  banks 
responsible for banking supervision have, in general, committed to bilateral memorandums 57 
 
of understanding (MOUs) with each other and central banks from other parts of the world. 
These bilateral MOUs usually at the very least entails information and data sharing, and 
joint onsite examination on banks that have offices in both jurisdictions.  In addition, a 
number  of  monetary  authorities/central  banks  of  major  ASEAN  economies  have  also 
participated  in  colleges  of  supervisors  following  the  recent  global  financial  crisis  since 
2009/2010. The colleges of supervisors are permanent, although flexible, structures for 
cooperation and coordination among the authorities responsible for and involved in the 
supervision of the different components of cross-border groups, specifically large groups. 
For Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd (HSBC) and Standard Chartered Bank for 
instance, Bank Indonesia, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank 
Sentral ng Pilipinas and Bank of Thailand are among the ASEAN Central Banks who are 
directly participating in the colleges of supervisors together with the home supervisors of 
these banks.  A more concrete step has also been taken to form a college of supervisors to 
coordinate the supervision of a regional bank. This effort should further enhance closer 
cooperation among the supervisors in the regions.  
 
 
5.3.3  Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization  
 
The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was launched at a meeting of ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers in Thailand in May 2000. This initiative has a broad set of objectives for financial 
cooperation,  involving  policy  dialogue,  monitoring  of  capital  flows,  and  reform  of 
international financial institutions. However, the series of bilateral swaps under CMI were 
found to be cumbersome and ineffective and it was, therefore, necessary to move from a 
bilateral to multilateral approach. In May 2009, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
(CMIM)  was  announced.  Under  the  CMIM,  the  members  of  ASEAN+3  agree  to  a  self 
managed reserve pooling arrangements governed by a single contractual agreement. The 
reserve  would  be  held  by  national  central  banks.  The  disposition  of  those  reserves, 
however, would be subjected to a single agreement. 
 
The CMI and CMIM are, indeed ,milestones for regional cooperation for ASEAN-plus 
3 economies. The recent sub-prime crisis showed that in spite of large foreign reserves, 
liquidity shortage could still rapidly emerge. In its initial stage, the total size of the reserve 
pooling under CMIM is about USD120 billion, a significant rise from the USD90 billion 
under  the  CMI  arrangement.  Table  11  provides  details  of  the  CMIM  contributions, 
purchasing  multiples  and  swap  facilities.  Each  of  the  five  major  ASEAN-5  (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) economies, for instance, contributes around 
USD4.5 billion and can draw around USD11.4 billion of swap facility support. 
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Table 11 
CMIM Contribution, Purchasing Multiplier and Swap Facility 
 







Facility (in US$ 
billion) 
(a) * (b) 
Brunei  0.03  5.0  0.15 
Cambodia  0.12  5.0  0.6 
PRC  (and 
Hong  Kong, China) 
38.4  0.5  19.2 
Indonesia  4.552  2.5  11.38 
Japan  38.4  0.5  19.2 
Korea  19.2  1.0  19.2 
Lao PDR  0.03  5.0  0.15 
Malaysia  4.552  2.5  11.38 
Myanmar  0.06  5.0  0.3 
Philippines  4.552  2.5  11.38 
Singapore  4.552  2.5  11.38 
Thailand  4.552  2.5  11.38 
Viet Nam  1.00  5.0  5.0 
 
Source:  The  Joint  Ministerial  Statement  of  the  13th  ASEAN+3  Finance  Ministers’  Meeting,  Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, 2 May 2010. 
 
 
6.   Going Forward and Concluding Remarks 
 
The two speed economic recoveries of the advanced and developing markets in the 
global  economy  are  expected  to  continue  in  2011  and  2012,  albeit  with  the  expected 
narrowing of the gap in the growth rates. Concerns remain with the risks arising from the 
problems in the sovereign debt markets and banking sectors in the Euro area, on-going 
geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, as well as less than encouraging news with the US 
economy. Going forward, initiatives taken by the advanced economies in dealing with their 
fiscal  sustainability  issues  are  also  expected  to  influence  the  global  economic  outlook 
beyond 2012. For commodity-dependent economies, such as Mongolia and Australia, the 
terms of trade condition is likely to be favourable in the coming years. 
 
Consequently, the emerging markets in Asia are forecasted to continue receiving an 
average of around 45 per cent of total capital flows to the emerging markets in the world 
(Table 1). In addition, barring major upheavals in the global and regional financial markets, 
the overall broad components of these flows in 2011 and 2012 are expected to exhibit 
similar trends. This means that market volatilities are also expected to remain. For most of 
the SEACEN economies, a fair share of these flows is in the forms of portfolio and banking 
flows. The challenges facing the monetary authorities and policy makers of the SEACEN 
economies this year and the next, are therefore, likely to be a continuation of those in 2010. 59 
 
Hence, the discussions in this paper on the consequences of these flows and the policy 
options and trade-offs will remain relevant for the near term.    
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